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Abstract: In his influential article on the ethics of eating animals, Alastair Norcross argues that
consumers of factory raised meat and puppy torturers are equally condemnable because both
knowingly cause serious harm to sentient creatures just for trivial pleasures. Against this claim, I argue
that those who buy and consume factory raised meat, even those who do so knowing that they cause
harm, have a partial excuse for their wrongdoings. Meat eaters act under social duress, which causes
volitional impairment, and they often act from deeply ingrained habits, which causes epistemic
impairment. But puppy torturers act against cultural norms and habits, consciously choosing to
perform wrongful acts. Consequently, the average consumer of factory raised meat has, while puppy
torturers lack, a cultural excuse. But although consumers of factory raised meat aren’t blameworthy, they
are partially morally responsible for their harmful behavior—and for this, they should feel regret,
remorse, and shame.

1. Introduction
As it’s widely known, industrial animal agriculture causes terrible harm to farmed animals. Animals on
factory farms are mutilated without anesthetic, confined to tiny cages or overcrowded sheds for their
entire lives, prevented from acting in species-normal ways, and slaughtered violently. This is just a
sample of the many harms factory farmed animals endure. And we don't need to eat animals—in fact,
according to the best health research, we would be healthier if we adopted a plant-based diet
(American Academy of Nutrition and Dietetics 2009).
But we like to eat meat, so we continue to cause terrible harm to farmed animals. Some animal
ethicists, then, compare consumers of factory raised meat to puppy torturers. In his popular essay on
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meat eating, Alastair Norcross (2004) argues that the behavior of “Fred,” a fictitious man who tortures
puppies for pleasure, is morally on par with the behavior of those who consume factory farmed meat
and that meat eaters and puppy torturers are equally condemnable. As he rhetorically asks, “[i]f we are
prepared to condemn [my emphasis] Fred for torturing puppies merely to enhance his gustatory
experiences, shouldn’t we similarly condemn [my emphasis] the millions who purchase and consume
factory-raised meat?” (Norcross 2004: 231).
Norcross endorses the Consumer-Torturer Equivalence Thesis (C-TET), which consists of two claims:
(1) The behavior of puppy torturers is morally on par with the behavior of consumers of factory
raised meat (CFRM).
(2) CFRM are just as condemnable as puppy torturers.
We certainly don’t act as though the C-TET is true. As Bob Fischer (2016: 186) observes, when it
comes to conventional food consumption, most of us, vegans included, “are unfazed by the dietary
choices of others—and when they bother us, we rarely express as much.” Yet, we do frequently and
outwardly express disdain for puppy torturers. So, if CFRM are just as condemnable as Fred, why
does it feel like they aren’t as malicious as puppy torturers? The answer is that, contra Norcross, CFRM
aren’t as condemnable as puppy torturers; they have a partial excuse for their behavior—an excuse
that puppy torturers lack. This excuse is what I refer to as the cultural excuse. As I argue, although the
first claim of the C-TET may be true, the second is surely false.
2. Preliminary Remarks
Some argue that because the factory farming industry is too large to be sensitive to one person’s
consumption choices, if you stop eating meat, you won’t prevent any harm to factory farmed animals.
(Harris & Galvin 2012). And if individual consumer choices don’t make a difference, then the behavior
of CFRM is relevantly different from Fred’s behavior. Because Matheny (2002) and Norcross (2004,
2

2008) offer convincing responses, I assume that the behavior of CFRM causes harm to farmed
animals, and thus it makes a difference. Nevertheless, as I argue, the C-TET is false.
The focus of this paper is backward-looking responsibility. While backward responsibility refers to
accountability for wrongful actions caused in the past, forward-looking responsibility refers to futureoriented obligations. Although I argue that CFRM have a partial excuse for their past behavior, this
doesn’t mean that they lack forward-looking duties to engage in individual or collective action to
prevent harm to farmed animals. But because the issue of forward-looking responsibility is complex,
I can’t address it within the space constraints of this paper. I thus consider only the degrees to which
puppy torturers and CFRM are responsible for their past behavior.
The concepts of blameworthiness and moral responsibility are relevant to questions pertaining to
backward-looking responsibility, and these concepts, while often conflated, come apart. Moral
responsibility comes in degrees, and only those who are fully responsible for their wrongful behavior,
i.e., those who don’t have a moral excuse, are blameworthy. Those who have a partial, but not full,
excuse are, to some degree, morally responsible, but they aren’t blameworthy. As Larry May (1992: 16
&135) puts it, “responsibility is a wider category than blame,” as some “morally faulty” behavior
doesn’t warrant blame. So, one can be morally responsible while being blameless. Essentially, the
thought is that the severely accusatory notions of “blame,” “blameworthy,” and “blameworthiness”
should be reserved only for those who are fully responsible for their wrongful conduct. But this doesn’t
mean that those who are morally responsible, but blameless, are off the hook; while they shouldn’t
feel moral guilt, they should feel “less severely accusatory” emotions such as shame, remorse, and
regret (May 1992: 146).
3. Consequentialist Moral Responsibility
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Because consequentialism plays an underlying role in Norcross’s argument, I address the C-TET
through a consequentialist framework. Perhaps, according to consequentialists, we should condemn
CFRM only if doing so maximizes intrinsic value. After all, blaming someone is an act, and the act of
blaming is justified only if it maximizes intrinsic value. But we must be mindful of the distinction
between the rightness of blaming an agent and an agent meriting blame. To say that an agent merits blame
is to say that the agent deserves blame insofar as she is at fault when she acted. To say that it’s right
to blame an agent is to say that one ought to blame the agent insofar as doing so will maximize optimal
consequences. So, sometimes we ought to blame someone who doesn’t merit blame, and sometimes
we ought not to blame someone who deserves blame (Feldman 1995: 574). After all, sometimes it
maximizes intrinsic value to blame those who don’t merit blame, and sometimes it maximizes intrinsic
value to refrain from blaming those who merit blame. This might lead some to believe that the
question of whether agents have an excuse for their wrongful conduct is irrelevant to
consequentialism, because whether an agent merits blame seems irrelevant to determining whether we
should blame her.
Yet, the rightness of blaming and blame-merit are intimately connected. There is arguably low
utility in publicly blaming someone who doesn’t merit blame. When we publicly blame someone for
their harmful conduct, we signal that the person knows better and thus isn’t in need of moral guidance
or education. But often agents violate moral norms because they don’t know better, and are in
desperate need of moral guidance and education. 1 And if (1) people who don’t merit blame need moral
0F

education and support to prevent them from performing wrongful acts in the future, and (2) blaming
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Relatedly, research shows that clinicians who blame patients are unlikely to offer them care, help, and a trusting

environment (Pickard 2012).
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people results in them not receiving moral education and support, consequentialists ought to
determine whether agents merit blame before deciding whether to blame them.
Because whether an agent merits blames is a good predictor of whether blaming her will maximize
intrinsic value, consequentialists have a practical reason to consider whether CFRM merit blame before
they publicly equate them with puppy torturers. Moreover, consequentialists have theoretical reason to
consider whether CFRM merit blame. To begin with, some say that there is a “responsibility
constraint” on consequentialist normative theories; acts can be right or wrong for us only if we can
be reasonably deemed responsible for them (Mason 2019). For instance, because teletransporting is
physically impossible, agents can’t be responsible for failing to teletransport, and because agents can’t
be responsible for failing to teletransport, teletransporting can never be the right action (Mason 2019).
Essentially, consequentialism holds that “an agent ought to perform an action of those available to her
which will have consequences at least as good as any other action available to her” (Moore 2006: 84),
and since, given its physical impossibility, teletransporting is not available to us, it can never be an
action we ought to perform.
Elinor Mason (2019) argues that because we aren’t responsible for some acts that we can physically
perform, these acts, too, can’t be right for us, presumably because they, too, aren’t really available to
us. For instance, if I am non-negligently unaware that act A would maximize intrinsic value, act A is
not actually available to me, even if I can physically perform act A. Furthermore, on Mason’s view,
because I can’t be responsible for failing to perform act A, act A can’t be right (and failing to perform
act A can’t be wrong). This view essentially amounts to some form of subjective consequentialism, which
is (roughly) the view that right acts are those that, given the best knowledge available to the agent, are
expected to maximize intrinsic value.
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While Mason argues that right acts are constrained by moral responsibility, other consequentialists
might argue that (1) right acts are constrained by physical possibility, and (2) moral responsibility is
constrained by right action. On this view, because teletransporting is physically impossible,
teletransporting can never be the right action, and because teletransporting can never be the right
action, I can never be responsible for my failure to teletransport. But the claim that moral
responsibility is constrained by right action doesn’t entail that right action is constrained by moral
responsibility. So, although we can’t be responsible for failing to perform acts that aren’t right, it’s
possible that actions can be right even when we aren’t responsible for our failure to perform them.
This view essentially amounts to objective consequentialism, which claims that acts are right when (1) they
maximize intrinsic value, and (2) we physically can perform them. Essentially, the idea is that any act
we can physically perform is an act that is available to us, and any act that is available to us could be
an act we ought to perform.
Both subjective and objective consequentialists should consider whether CFRM merit blame. For
one, subjective consequentialism entails that if CFRM aren’t responsible for their behavior, then
CFRM don’t act wrongly when they eat animals. And if puppy torturers act wrongly when they torture
puppies, but CFRM don’t, then the behavior of CFRM isn’t morally on par with the behavior of puppy
torturers, thus both claims of the C-TET should be rejected.
Objective consequentialists who evaluate the C-TET must also attend to the question of blamemerit, simply because drawing a distinction between the evaluation of an agent (her motivations,
intentions, and beliefs), and the evaluation of the agent’s act(s) is what makes objective
consequentialism plausible (Moore 2006). To see why this is, consider the following: there is a
tendency to assume that the claim “P does something wrong (because P doesn’t maximize intrinsic
value)” entails that “P should be blamed or punished” (Howard-Snyder 1997; Miller 2003). But since
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we sometimes can’t clearly foresee or fully control the consequences of our acts, it can’t be the case
that we ought to always be blamed or punished for failing to maximize intrinsic value when we
physically could have. However, objective consequentialists can guard against this objection by saying
that the evaluation of acts is independent from the evaluation of actors (Moore 2006). Because
objective consequentialists employ the distinction between the rightness of acts and the responsibility
of agents, they need to be able to explain what it means for an agent to be morally responsible. After
all, it would be odd for consequentialists to say that there’s a distinction between the evaluation of
acts and the evaluation of actors if they can’t even articulate what it means to judge an actor to be
morally responsible. Objective consequentialists writing about the C-TET, then, ought to be
concerned not only with the question “Should we blame CFRM?,” but also with the question “Do
CFRM deserve to be blamed?”
Moving forward, I argue that CFRM aren’t fully responsible for their behavior, and this has
implications for both objective and subjective consequentialism. Objective consequentialism entails
that if CFRM have an excuse, they aren’t fully responsible for their wrongful behavior, and subjective
consequentialism entails that if CFRM have an excuse, then they don’t act wrongly (or “as wrongly”
as someone who doesn’t have an excuse). Both approaches challenge the C-TET, but, for the sake of
simplicity, moving forward, I assume an objective consequentialist framework. 2
1F

4. Excuses and Justification
When one is accused of wrongdoing, there are two possible defenses: justification or excuse. For
instance, if A kills B, one might accuse A of doing something wrong. But A might defend himself by
claiming that he did nothing wrong, as he killed in self-defense, and is thus justified in killing B. And A
2
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subjective consequentialism.
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would be right. Killing in self-defense is the paradigm case of justified killing in both moral and legal
theory. You do no wrong, both morally and legally speaking, when you kill a culpable and lethal threat.
Indeed, killing in self-defense is categorized as justifiable homicide in our legal system. You need no
excuse for killing such a threat. That is, you don’t need to defend your defensive action by claiming
that you killed the aggressor during your sleep or that you were drugged against your will. After all, to
say that an act is justified is to deny that it is wrong. 3 But, as noted in the Model Penal Code, “to say
2F

that someone's conduct is 'excused' ordinarily connotes that the conduct is thought to be undesirable
but that for some reason the actor is not [responsible] for it.”
Likewise, in moral theory, justification and excuse are two different types of moral defenses for
questionable conduct. When someone claims that her act is justified, she accepts responsibility for her
conduct, but denies that it’s wrong. To say that a person is excused, though, is to admit that the
person’s conduct is wrong, while denying that the person is fully responsible for their conduct. Valid
moral excuses, then, negate or lessen moral responsibility.
In moral theory, common excuses for wrongful conduct include: (1) non-culpable ignorance, (2)
necessity, (3) insanity, (4) diminished capacity, and (5) provocation. 4 Note that excuses are not always
3F

full or complete excuses; sometimes they are partial excuses. Moral responsibility, then, isn’t an “all or
nothing” concept; it come in degrees; an agent can be completely blameless, fully blameworthy, or
partially responsible for wrongdoing.
In order to be fully responsible, i.e., blameworthy, for one’s actions, two conditions must be met:
(1) the control condition (the freedom condition), and (2) the epistemic condition (the knowledge
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There is debate about whether ‘necessity’ constitutes a justification or an excuse (Morgan 1984).
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condition) (Fischer & Ravizza 1998). To be fully responsible for wrongful conduct, one must perform
the act freely, and one must be sufficiently aware of what one is doing when one acts. In what follows,
I argue that CFRM are partially excused insofar as they fully satisfy neither the control nor the
epistemic requirements.
5. The Objectivist Theory of Justification
When we eat factory farmed meat, we cause terrible harm to animals, despite that eating animals isn’t
necessary for human health. This is objectively wrong, at least when plant-based alternatives are available.
So, CFRM act wrongly; they do something that is objectively impermissible. But this doesn’t mean
that we should condemn them. After all, not everyone who performs impermissible acts are
blameworthy. Indeed, there are often excusing conditions.
Because Norcross claims that we ought to condemn CFRM, he suggests that they are fully
responsible for their behavior. He does, though, consider this objection: CFRM are not aware of what
animals endure on factory farms. In response, he tweaks his conclusion: the behavior of those who
purchase and consume factory raised meat in the knowledge that the animals live lives of suffering and deprivation
is morally on par with the behavior of puppy torturers (Norcross 2004: 236). Perhaps, then, some
CFRM who are unaware that factory farmed animals live lives of suffering and deprivation are excused
for their behavior. 5
4F

Let’s grant that CFRM are aware (or should be aware) of the terrible harm animals endure on
factory farms. So, the ignorance excuse is off the table. Still, there are other possible excusing factors
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information about industrial animal agriculture.
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for CFRM, even those who know that the lives of farmed animals are filled with suffering and
deprivation.
But, first, we must be clear on what is meant by the average CFRM. 6 I take it that the average CFRM:
5F

(1) is not insane. So, the insanity defense won’t work.
(2) has access to plant-based foods. So, necessity can’t operate as a moral excuse.
(3) is a rational adult agent without mental abnormalities. So, the diminished agency excuse won’t
work. 7
6F

While CFRM can’t claim insanity, necessity, or diminished agency as excuses, as I will argue, there is
a cultural excuse available to CFRM, which involves both volitional and epistemic impairments.
6. Enculturation
A compelling account of the “culture defense” in legal theory is presented by Alison Renteln
(2004), who insists that the courts can’t understand the motives of a defendant if they don’t understand
the defendant’s culture. She argues that people can be so strongly influenced by their culture that their
behavior is, in some sense, compelled and thus, at least, partially excused. The “cultural defense” is
closely linked to the concept of enculturation, which anthropologists define as the process by which “a
person’s culture shapes his worldview” in a “profound manner” (Renteln 1994, 60). The basic idea is
that people often internalize cultural norms, and this has a powerful influence on their behavior. As
Soloman Asch (1955: 34) puts it, “[t]he tendency to conformity in our society is so strong that
reasonably intelligent and well-meaning young people are willing to call white black.”

6
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Children have diminished agency, and thus are, at the very least, partially excused for eating animals.
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I argue that certain kinds of enculturation involve a serious form of social threat, and this
threat can, under certain conditions, amount to social duress, which in turn causes volitional
impairment. Moreover, I argue that certain kinds of cultural pressure and influence impair the
epistemic capacities of agents, rendering them, to some extent, unaware of the moral significance of
some of their acts. Consequently, when one performs a wrong act because of this kind of cultural
influence, one is at least partially excused.
7. The Cultural Excuse: Social Duress
To see why some forms of cultural influence amounts to social duress, consider first the legal
definition of duress:
any unlawful threat or coercion used... to induce another to act [or not act] in a manner [they]
otherwise would not [or would]. (Black 1990)
Because cultural influence involves an “unlawful” 8 threat to induce others to eat animals—an act they
7F

would not otherwise perform in alternative circumstances—this cultural influence is a form of duress.
I thus argue that the wrong of eating animals can be partially excusable on grounds of social duress. In
doing so, I challenge Fischer’s (2016: 185) claim that because “beef lobbyists [aren’t] holding guns to
[their] heads,” the duress excuse is not available to CFRM. Duress comes in degrees, and one need
not have a gun pointed to one’s head in order to act under duress.
Typically, for duress to count as an excuse to escape legal liability, the standard is similar to
Fischer’s—there must be an imminent threat to life or physical well-being. I contend that while this
standard may be necessary for a full excuse, it’s not necessary for a partial excuse. Consider, for instance,
8
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to involve an immoral threat(s). So, when parents threaten to give their children time-outs if they don’t eat vegetables, this
doesn’t constitute duress, insofar as such a threat doesn’t violate the moral law. Indeed, parents should instruct their
children to eat vegetables.
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the case of George, Jane, and Bob. George threatens to steal Jane’s bike if she doesn’t steal Bob’s bike,
so Jane steals Bob’s bike. Say that Jane’s bike is very special to her—her grandfather gave it to her
before he passed away. Surely, Jane’s behavior is more excusable than it would be if she stole Bob’s
bike just because she doesn’t like him. This is because there’s a sense in which Jane acts under duress,
despite that neither her life nor physical well-being are threatened. Of course, this doesn’t completely
exculpate Jane. But it does, to some degree, lessen her level of moral responsibility.
When someone performs an act under duress, outside human influences make it especially
difficult for the average person to refuse to perform the act in question. Social duress, then, refers to
social and cultural pressure that induce someone, by means of a threat, to think or act in a way that
they would not have otherwise. There are degrees of social duress, and thus degrees of moral
responsibility. For one’s actions to be partially excused due to social duress, three conditions must be
met:
1. There must be widespread societal influence or pressure to do wrong—a pressure that
involves a threat.
2. One does wrong because of the societal influence.
3. It’s not reasonably easy to act otherwise.
As I will argue, each condition applies to CFRM, and thus they have a partial excuse for their behavior.
8. Social Duress, Volitional Impairment, and Eating Animals
If one thing is true, it’s that there’s significant cultural pressure to eat animals in the United States. To
begin with, only 4% of U.S. adult consumers are vegetarian and only 2% are vegan (The Vegetarian
Resource Group 2019). And it’s not just a coincidence that most consumers eat animals. As children,
we are raised to eat animals; we are instructed to eat animals at family dinners and in the homes of
friends, schools, hospitals, and so forth.
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Children don’t themselves make the choice to eat animals. Arguably, if they were given the choice
and they fully understood the moral significance of that choice, they wouldn’t choose to eat animals.
In many cases, children exhibit disgust for meat when they learn about its origins (Amato & Partridge
1989; Fiddles 1991). Relatedly, when animals are presented in meat advertisements, adult consumers
are less willing to eat animals (Kunst & Hohle 2016), which indicates that humans have a natural sense
of compassion for animals. This is perhaps why meat labels and advertisements often “erase” the
animal by referring to pig flesh as pork and cow flesh as beef (Adams 1990).
Children have a strong affinity for animals, which is evident by the fact that they frequently dream
about animals (Domhoff 1996; Foulkes 1999; Melson 2005) and desire to adopt companion animals
(Kidd & Kidd 1985). Children who live with companion animals say that their animal companions
make them happy, they love the animals, and the animals are their best friends (Hawkins & Williams
2017). This all indicates that children who spend quality time with animals almost always form deep
emotional attachments to them (Hawkins & Williams 2017). As Paul McCartney might put it, if
slaughterhouses had glass walls, all children would be vegan.
But neither factory farms nor slaughterhouses have glass walls, and this is, in part, why children
are unaware that when they eat, for instance, a hot dog, they are eating Babe. But once children are
old enough to understand that “meat” is animal flesh, they are quickly socialized through the
institutions of family, education, and mass media to define farmed animals as food, and they learn to
conceptually distance “food animals” from those animals with whom they are emotionally bonded
(Stewart & Cole 2009). This social pressure to eat animals follows children throughout their teenage
years. Although some teens consider transitioning to veganism, they often report that social pressure
and having a weak vegan network is a main reason they continue to eat animals (Worsley & Skrzypiec
1998; Larsson et al. 2003; Cherry 2015).
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An animal-based diet is rarely called into question, in part, because eating animals is central to our
social lives. For instance, animal flesh is typically viewed as the keystone dish at important social and
familial gatherings in Western culture, including Thanksgiving, weekend BBQs, and family dinners.
Eating and cooking involves opportunities for family and friends to intimately bond with one another
and rejecting animal flesh is often perceived as a disruption to familial and cultural practices and
traditions (Hinton 2008). Someone who rejects the “standard” diet thus risks losing their identity as a
family member, or as an American, or as a Mexican, and so on.
Because eating is central to our social lives and meat is usually the main dish at meals, meat eating
has an important non-dietary role in society; it is a social practice that promotes familial and social
relationships. Some black people, for instance, are committed to preserving “soul” in their food, and
some believe that the consumption of animal-based soul food, which dates back to slavery, enables
them to connect with their culture in a historic and intimate sense (Hughes 1997; Miller 2013; Witt
1999). For many black people, what they eat carries cultural and racial meaning, insofar as their dietary
choices help them construct their African-American identities, and in black communities, eating
healthy is often perceived as giving up one’s cultural heritage and conforming to the dominant culture
(James 2004).
In addition to being deeply influenced by familial and cultural expectations, consumers are strongly
influenced by meat advertisements on TV, radio, billboards, Internet, and so forth (Bogueva & Phau
2016). As Corey Wrenn (2016) puts it, “[t]he “meat” industry has been bombarding the public with
strategic advertising to increase profits for a century or more.” For instance, the meat industry has a
history of using advertising and social messaging to promote the idea that animal flesh is linked to
masculinity (Adams 1990; Rothgerber 2013; Sobal 2005), while vegetarianism is deemed not only
feminine, but anti-masculine (Rogers 2008). Meat eating is thus a symbol of achievement, power, and
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domination, which explains why vegetarians are perceived to be less masculine than meat eaters (Ruby
& Heine 2011).
But meat and dairy marketing doesn’t target only men; it encourages virtually every consumer to
eat animal products. Milk ads, for instance, encourage women to feed their babies cow milk. Television
channels directly target children with advertisements for food with high levels of fat, especially milkrelated products (Arnas 2006). Relatedly, as Wrenn (2018) notes, the United States Department of
Agriculture promotes misleading health requirements that center upon meat and dairy. And, until
recently, doctors encouraged their patients to eat animals, despite that eating animals has a deleterious
impact on human health.
Because there are such deep social influences that perpetuate and legitimate the norm of meat
eating (Paisley et al. 2008), many people who attempt to become vegetarian report feeling socially
unsupported (Hodson & Earle 2018), and some are even met with hostility when they publicly identify
as vegetarian (MacInnis & Hodson 2017). Vegetarians report that, because of their dietary choices,
they are exposed to prejudice, family pressure, and peer pressure—all of which have significant
emotional and social costs. The social stigmas around vegetarianism have significant influence on
consumer choices, as evident by the fact that many ex-vegetarians cite a toll on their social life as their
reason for resuming meat eating (Faunalytics 2015). 9
8F

There is compelling evidence that CFRM eat animals because of social pressure. For one, some men
report that they are interested in reducing their meat consumption, but that social pressure makes
doing so difficult (Royal Geographical Society 2018). As Emma Roe puts it: “many men are interested
in eating less animal flesh, they just need social permission to do so” (Royal Geographical Society
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2018). Because it’s widely believed that masculinity is intertwined with eating animals, men often eat
animals because it makes them feel and look like “real men” (Rothgerber 2013). This social pressure
to “eat like a real man” explains why men are less likely than women to stop eating animals (Graca &
Calheiros 2015).
When men cave to the pressure to eat animals, this has a domino effect throughout society. For
instance, Charles and Kerr (1988: 71) point out that men “exert a conservative influence over families’
diets and prevent their partners from experimenting with food or introducing changes into the diet.”
While women may do more of the grocery shopping and cooking, they have little control over the
food they buy and cook (Charles and Kerr 1988). Women often prioritize their partners’ food
preferences and modify their dietary behaviors to reflect these preferences (Murcott 1983; Bove et al.
2003). In fact, many women report that they would eat less meat if they lived alone (Charles & Kerr
1988).
Meat eating families, then, are barriers to vegetarianism (Lea & Worsley 2003). Teenagers who
consider vegetarianism often face challenges at home, as their parents doubt that vegetarianism is
nutritionally adequate (Larsson et al. 2003). Relatedly, adopting a vegetarian diet is especially
challenging for black families because it seems to require a significant shift in cultural identity food
politics (Carter 2016). As Christopher Carter (2016: 225) explains, black people who refuse to eat
animals risk giving up their sense of “soul”—their “sense of black spirituality and identity.” Because
soul food is deeply connected to black identity and black spirituality, it’s not uncommon for the friends
and relatives of black people to be unsupportive of their dietary changes (James 2010).
This all indicates that the cultural pressure to eat animals involves a broad-based cultural threat.
Culture threatens that men will lose their masculinity if they stop eating animals. Culture threatens
teenagers that they will lose their social network if they become vegetarian. Culture threatens to tear
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apart families if a family member refuses to eat animals. Culture threatens that black people will lose
their sense of black spirituality and identity if they become vegetarian. And these social losses, which
involve the disruption of deeply important social and familial relationships and the destruction of one’s
own sense of identity, are significant losses, despite that they are not life-threatening.
It thus isn’t reasonably easy to become vegetarian. To do so requires that we transform our values
and belief systems, transcend societal norms, jeopardize our social networks, give up some of our
social identities, and defy familial, cultural, and religious traditions. Essentially, it requires that we
assume the significant risk of losing social goods that are necessary for a decent human life. While
CFRM might not have a gun held to their heads when they heap turkey flesh on their plates during
Thanksgiving dinners, they certainly act under a serious cultural threat. And because CFRM act under
social duress when they eat animals, they don’t fully meet the “volitional requirement” of moral
responsibility and thus have at least a partial excuse for their wrongdoing.
9. The Epistemic Condition: De Dicto Ignorance
In section IV, I granted, for the sake of argument, that the ignorance excuse is unavailable to
CFRM. I did this because I wanted to show that even if they can’t plead ignorance, CFRM still have
a volitional excuse for their wrongdoing. Now, I argue that CFRM in fact have an epistemic excuse.
In order to be fully responsible for wrong-doing, wrong-doers must be sufficiently aware of
what they are doing when they act. This is known as the epistemic condition for moral responsibility.
In general, it’s assumed that to be sufficiently aware, one must be aware of certain things and this awareness
must be of a certain kind. One concern, then, is related to the content of awareness. For instance, to be
fully responsible for an act, one must be aware of the act’s moral significance.
There are two possible kinds of awareness: de re awareness and de dicto awareness. One has
de dicto awareness of an act’s moral significance when one believes that the act is wrong, and one has
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de re awareness of an act’s moral significance when one has the belief that the act has whatever features
that make it wrong, without having the further belief that the act is wrong. Relatedly, as May (1992)
compellingly argues, in order to possess the attitude of moral sensitivity, you must not only be aware
that your actions affect the well-being of others. You must also have a critical appreciation of this. You
must believe that the suffering of others is legitimate, significant, or worthy. Moral sensitivity, then,
requires both perceptiveness and critical appreciation. Those who have merely de re awareness have
perceptiveness, but they lack critical appreciation, and thus they lack moral sensitivity.
Although CFRM arguably have perceptiveness, insofar as they are, to some extent, aware that
animals are adversely affected by meat eating, many seem to believe that animals aren’t hurt in any
significant way. This is because they lack the critical appreciation necessary to see animal suffering as
legitimate or worthy of our serious moral attention. Perhaps, then, CFRM have de re, but not de dicto
awareness about the moral significance of meat eating. That is, even if they are presented with a
detailed description of the conditions of factory farms and are thus aware of the features of meat
eating that make it wrong, they still might fail to understand that meat eating is wrong because they
lack a critical appreciation of the suffering endured by farmed animals. And if full responsibility
requires de dicto awareness, as Sliwa (2017) plausibly argues, then CFRM fail the awareness condition.
Norcross (2004: 236) doesn’t claim that CFRM have knowledge of the general moral principle
that “it’s wrong to cause unnecessary suffering”; rather, he claims that CFRM know that farmed
animals “live lives of suffering and deprivation.” This suggests that he believes that knowledge of
moral principles isn’t necessary for full moral responsibility. But this approach to moral responsibility
is rightly called into question, especially when it comes to acts that are deeply normalized in our society.
Gideon Rosen (2003: 65), for example, compellingly argues that moral ignorance is, in general,
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blameless when it comes to adopting and acting on “uncontroversial normative principles that form
the framework for social life.”
Rosen (2003) points out that some culturally normalized acts are assumed to be
“transparently” permissible, and often people are neither negligent nor reckless when they arrive at
the incorrect “moral verdict” about culturally normalized acts, even when they know the relevant
nonmoral facts, including the features of the acts that make them wrong. As Rosen (2003: 27) plausibly
argues, to change such culturally ingrained beliefs requires a transformation of one’s current “moral
sensibility” and the invention of a new sensibility—an arguably “monumental task.” Likewise, May
(1992) argues that moral insensitivity is difficult to change when it is a result of deeply ingrained
stereotypic beliefs and attitudes. Stereotypic beliefs and attitudes “demark” the stereotyped groups as
completely distinct from those who possess the stereotypic beliefs and attitudes, and they are difficult
to change because they are “resistant to counter evidence” (May 1992: 65). As May (1992: 65) explains,
Stereotypes are perpetuated by means of highly emotional language and images, which are so
extreme as to break down possible communities that might be formed between those who
hold the beliefs and those who are so characterized.
Changing these stereotypic attitudes, then, is no easy task; it involves consciousness raising,
psychotherapy, psychoanalysis and serious private resolutions (May 1992).
When the source of stereotypic beliefs and attitudes is one’s culture, they are formed in a way
that is beyond our control, thus we cannot be deemed fully responsible for the fact that we have them
(May 1992). This suggests that de dicto ignorance about culturally normalized acts is at least partially
excusable. And this seems especially true when it comes to CFRM’s de dicto ignorance. After all,
there’s a widespread assumption in Western cultures that we are “obviously” entitled to eat farmed
animals, despite that terrible suffering is inherent to industrial animal agriculture. This is arguably
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because the creatures who are harmed are commonly deemed “just animals.” And the belief that we
are morally entitled to eat animals is taken to be self-evidently true or what Rosen would call an
“undefended axiom of moral common sense” (Rosen 2003). Because of our deeply ingrained
stereotypic attitudes and beliefs about farmed animals, we fail to appreciate that they are like us in a
way that matters; we fail to appreciate that they can suffer like we do. Stereotypical attitudes and beliefs
about farmed animals, as May (1992) would put it, “block” any attempt to truly understand and
appreciate animal suffering; the stereotypes cause us to perceive animals to be so “different” from and
inferior to humans. Arguably, the moral insensitivity of CFRM is the result of stereotypies, which, in
this case, are themselves a consequence of cultural indoctrination that CFRM have faced throughout
their entire lives.
To see the wrongness of a culturally normalized act requires more than just an understanding
of the description of the act and its consequences; it requires a considerable amount of moral
reflection. Although philosophers are capable of such reflection, and thus are fully responsible for
eating animals, it’s not reasonable to hold the average consumer to the same standard, given their lack
of training in moral reasoning and deliberation. Failing to see through the deeply entrenched and
pervasive cultural ideology of speciesism is not reckless or negligent. Rather, it is, as Rosen (2003: 66)
might put it, a sign of ordinariness.
10. The Epistemic Condition: Occurrent Belief Ignorance
Even if we grant that either (1) de re awareness is sufficient to satisfy the epistemic condition, or (2)
CFRM have, or should have, de dicto awareness of the moral significance of eating animals, it still
doesn’t follow that CFRM are blamable for eating animals. After all, there is a compelling argument
that the epistemic condition requires the occurrent entertainment of morally significant beliefs (Ginet
2001; Levy 2011; Zimmerman 2017). This means that in order to be blamable for wrongdoing, the
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relevant beliefs about the moral significance of the act must be consciously entertained at the time of
wrongdoing (Zimmerman 1997). On this view, if CFRM don’t consciously entertain beliefs about the
consequences and moral significance of eating animals while they eat meat, then they are, to some degree,
ignorant of the relevant considerations and thus may have at least a partial excuse for their
wrongdoings.
Surely, when CFRM order hamburgers at McDonalds, they don’t consciously contemplate the
consequences of their purchases. This is because the force of cultural conditioning often prevents us
from reflecting upon culturally normalized acts before performing them (Lumsden 2017). When it
comes to eating animals, “[o]ne does not have to justify eating meat; it does not require reasons, it is
just ‘what one does’ in this society” (Lumsden 2017: 230). According to recent research, dietary
behaviors, including meat eating, are strongly habitualized behaviors that rarely involve a deliberative
process (Schösler et al. 2014). Because habitual behaviors are often performed unintentionally, and
thus outside of conscious awareness, they’re quite difficult to change (Rees et al. 2018). Here’s why
someone might say this.
Habits develop from the repeated performance of behaviors in a “stable situational context”
(Rees et al. 2018). Once habits are formed, strong mental context-action links are created, resulting in
specific situational contexts triggering what now have become habitual behaviors. For instance,
repeatedly ordering meat at lunch in the cafeteria causes me to develop a strong mental context-action
link, i.e., a link between meat eating and the cafeteria at lunch. So, tomorrow, when I go to the cafeteria,
this context-action link will be activated, which then triggers my animal eating behavior, and I will
likely, without consciously reflecting upon my options, order animal flesh.
CFRM aren’t consciously aware that they are eating animals when they eat meat, so, when they
eat a McDonald’s hamburger, they are at least partially unaware of the moral significance of their
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behavior. But even if meat eating occurs outside of conscious awareness, it arguably occurs within what
Larry May calls our pre-reflective awareness. When we act from habit, we act without the relevant
awareness, i.e., conscious awareness, necessary for full epistemic responsibility. But because we have
partial control over the acts we perform pre-reflectively, CFRM have enough awareness, i.e., pre-reflective
awareness, for partial responsibility.
Perhaps, though, occurrent-belief theories are misguided, insofar as they seem to let
wrongdoers off the hook too easily. For instance, the occurrent-belief view seems to entail that
individuals can avoid moral responsibility for wrongdoing by simply avoiding thinking about the moral
significance of their acts. To this, I say we can modify the occurrent-belief view such that it says that
an agent isn’t fully responsible for her wrongful conduct if (1) she doesn’t entertain the morally
relevant belief occurrently at the time of acting, (2) she doesn’t intentionally avoid thinking about this
belief when acting, and (3) there are no obvious expectations that she reflect upon this belief before
acting. 10
9F

Often, when we act wrongly, we do so in private. For instance, an adulterer cheats on his
partner behind closed doors, and he does so to avoid the negative consequences he would endure if
others (including his spouse) were to find out about his transgressions. To act in secret like this, then,
involves a constant reminder that one’s activities are morally suspect, and thus it’s quite difficult, if
not impossible, for an adulterer to avoid thinking about the moral significance of his conduct before
he cheats. And if, for some reason, beliefs about the moral significance of cheating aren’t entertained
by an adulterer before he cheats, the adulterer’s ignorance is fully culpable. Given that adulterers must
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This means that CFRM who purposefully avoid thinking about the wrongness of meat-eating are not excused in the

occurrent belief sense.
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act in secret, adulterers have good reason to suspect that their behavior is morally deviant, and thus
they have good reason to stop and think about the moral significance of their behavior.
CFRM, though, don’t eat hamburgers in secret. Rather, meat eating is a public act, done in the
company of one’s entire society. Because there’s no obvious expectation that CFRM who visit
McDonald’s stop and consider the moral significance of buying a cheeseburger and meat eating is
deeply habitualized behavior, CFRM don’t intentionally avoid thinking about the moral significance
of eating meat when they’re at a restaurant or in the grocery store. For these reasons, CFRM aren’t
fully responsible for their occurrent-belief ignorance.
This all suggests that there is a relevant distinction between what Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (2005)
calls “usual” and “unusual” acts. As he puts it, “[if] my act is unusual in the sense that most people
would not act that way, that… provides a reason to pick out my act and call it a cause” (SinnottArmstrong 2005: 297-298). I take this to mean that when a person performs an act that violates social
norms, that person is the sole author of the act. When an agent decides to perform an act that society
condemns, she, on her own accord, authentically chooses the act, and she moreover chooses to identify
with that action. Yet, a person who performs a culturally normalized act may not have full ownership
of the act. Because of powerful societal pressure, the culturally normalized acts we perform often
aren’t a consequence of our authentic choices. In many cases, something beyond the agent is at least
partially the cause of her culturally normalized act—a cause like social influence.
11. Puppy Torturers, Volitional Impairment, and the Cultural Excuse
While CFRM perform unjustified acts, they have a partial excuse for their wrongful behavior—an
excuse that puppy torturers lack. For one, puppy torturers perform acts that are deemed reprehensible
by their culture. So, it’s not the case that, every time puppy torturers turn on their Pandora playlists,
their music is constantly interrupted with ads that promote puppy-torturing or puppy-tortured
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products. It’s not the case that every time puppy torturers have dinner with friends and family, they’re
mocked, called weird, and emasculated if they abstain from puppy-tortured products. It’s not the case
that puppy torturers risk losing their familial, social, and spiritual networks if they stop torturing
puppies. Quite the contrary, they risk losing important goods by continuing to torture puppies. For
these reasons, the decision to torture puppies is not due to cultural pressure, let alone social duress.
Moreover, the moral insensitivity of puppy torturers isn’t the result of cultural stereotypes about
puppies; rather, puppy torturers are themselves the cause of their insensitivity. Puppy torturers, then,
unlike CFRM, choose their insensitivity and thus are responsible for any de dicto ignorance they might
have about the morality of puppy torturing. And because puppy-torturing acts are unusual, contrary
to cultural norms, and intentionally performed in private, they are not deeply habitualized, as is meat
eating. In other words, puppy torturers are consciously aware of the harm they cause when they torture
puppies. Because puppy torturers, on their own accord, consciously decide to torture puppies, they
consciously legitimatize puppy torturing, and thus they, unlike CFRM, are the sole cause and author
of their behavior.
12. The Moral of the story: Blame the Culture; Don’t Blame the non-blameworthy
While it’s not justified to eat factory farmed products, CFRM, unlike puppy torturers, have at least a
partial excuse for doing so and thus aren’t blamable. But to say that CFRM are partially excused is not
to say that cultural influence is fully exculpatory. Surely, CFRM are, to some degree, morally responsible
for their behavior, insofar as it’s within their power to resist cultural pressure, however difficult it
might be. As May (1992) compellingly argues, because we can try to change the dispositions we acquire
through no fault of our own, we are at least partially responsible for failing to try to change our harmproducing dispositions.
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But, still, CFRM have a partial excuse, and we ought to be sensitive to this, in part, because
it’s, at best, unproductive, and, at worst, counterproductive to blame CFRM. For instance, telling
CFRM that they’re just as bad as puppy torturers may shut down thoughtful discourse about the
immorality of eating animals. CFRM might spend their mental energies devising excuses or
justifications for their behavior in a desperate attempt to distinguish themselves from puppy torturing.
And, as discussed earlier, publicly deeming CFRM ‘blamable’ likely may prevent them from receiving
the moral education and support they need for change. Moreover, we must acknowledge the relevant
differences between puppy torturing and meat eating so that we can better understand how to
effectively address both problems.
If eating animals is, in part, a result of moral insensitivity that is caused and perpetuated by
stereotypic attitudes and beliefs about farmed animals, then we must work to challenge these attitudes
and beliefs. Because stereotypic attitudes and beliefs involve a demarcation of farmed animals from
humans, we can challenge them by emphasizing the important similarities between humans and
farmed animals. For instance, both teachers and activists should screen and publicize films that capture
the complex cognitive and emotional mental lives of farmed animals, in lieu of graphic films about
factory farming, which don’t challenge the human-farmed animal demarcation.
Moreover, if eating animals is, in part, a result of habit, we must help CFRM develop plans to
break this habit. As research shows, with significant effort, we can, over time, learn to break even
deeply engrained habits. Effective habit control techniques, for instance, have proved successful in
combating unwanted habits (Rees et al. 2018). One such technique is a self-regulatory technique called
“implementation intention,” which involves deliberation about a goal, consciously forming an
intention to achieve it, and making a concrete, specific plan about how to attain it. There’s evidence
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that by forming an implementation intention, meat eaters can reduce their meat consumption, despite
the highly habitualized nature of meat eating (Rees et al. 2018).
Here’s an effective habit-control activity, modeled after Rees et al.’s (2018) study, which
teachers should give to their students after discussing the ethics of eating animals:
1. The teacher should ask students if they have a goal to reduce meat consumption.
2. Those who say yes should write down their goal.
3. The teacher should ask students to imagine a concrete situation (time and location) for
implementing their meat reduction goal and plan what they’d eat instead of meat.
4. Students should then write down their “if then plan.” For instance, “if I am in the cafeteria
in the morning for breakfast, I will eat a tofu scramble instead of eggs and bacon.”
5. Finally, students should be encouraged to memorize this plan.

As studies show, the intention implementation method is effective insofar as it creates an important
situation-action link—a link similar to the action-link resulting from habit formation (Rees et al. 2018).
For instance, by forming the implementation intention suggested in step 4, students will eventually
see a link between being in the cafeteria at lunchtime and ordering the tofu scramble.
Because animal rights activists can’t make use of the implementation method during normal
outreach events, they must employ different tactics. Given the power of cultural pressure, it would
behoove animal rights activist to make veganism a normalized part of their culture, for instance, by
urging college campuses and local restaurants to offer a variety of tasty and affordable plant-based
options on their food menus, such as the Impossible Burger. Moreover, because social media is a
prominent cultural force and marketing normalizes what is being advertised, sharing and promoting
plant-based advertisements on social media has the power to encourage consumers to shift to a vegan
diet. Relatedly, we must acknowledge that some radical animal rights tactics are unlikely to help farmed
animals. For instance, the “disruption” tactics of Direct Action Everywhere, which often involve
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chanting “meat is murder” in restaurants and grocery stores, may paint vegans as socially deviant,
making it less likely that CFRM will be inspired to become vegan.
13. Conclusion
Given the complex and influential political, social, and cultural webs in which we find ourselves
entangled, the ways in which our ability to act freely and reflectively is often partially impaired. CFRM,
too, are subject to deep cultural influences—they are socially conditioned, pressured, and threatened
to consume animals, despite that doing so hurts so much. Eating animals, then, isn’t an authentic,
individual choice—it’s, in part, the product of deeply ingrained social norms that are perpetuated and
reinforced by our family, friends, doctors, teachers, religious leaders, and society at large. So, while it’s
true that both puppy torturers and CFRM cause terrible, unnecessary harm to animals, the conditions
under which they act are relevantly different. The cultural duress and moral ignorance under which
CFRM act gives them at least a partial excuse that is unavailable to puppy torturers.
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